Type de contenu : Texte
Type de médiation : sans médiation
Titre(s) : The European campaign : its origins and conduct / Samuel J. Newland, Clayton K. S. Chun
Auteur(s) : Newland, Samuel J
Autre(s) auteur(s) : Chun, Clayton K. S.
Autre(s) responsabilité(s) : Army War College U.S., Strategic Studies Institute - Éditeur scientifique
Mention d'édition : [Reprod. en fac-sim.]
Editeur, producteur : Milton Keynes : [s.n.], 2011
Description matérielle : 1 vol. (X-455 p.) : ill., cartes, portr. ; 23 cm
EAN : 9781780394602
Classification décimale Dewey : 940.542 1
Note(s) : "Juin 2011"
Note sur les bibliographies et les index : Bibliogr. p. 389-406. Notes bibliogr.
Note sur l'original reproduit : Reprod. en fac.-sim. de l'édition originale : Carlisle (Pa.) : Strategic studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011
Note sur le contenu : Introduction Chapter 1. The European campaign : origins Chapter 2. Was Europe first ? Chapter 3. 1943 : Frustrations and successes Chapter 4. D-Day : Planning and execution Chapter 5. Toward the German border : Operations COBRA, the Falaise Pocket, and Operation ANVIL Chapter 6. Operation MARKET GARDEN Chapter 7. The Hürtgen Campaign Chapter 8. The Ardennes Offensive Chapter 9. The Ruhr or Berlin Chapter 10. Conclusions and observations Appendix I. Developing strategy : a look at the other side Appendix II. To Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force
Résumé ou extrait : Given the significance of World War II and the interest in the European Campaign, the authors offer a fresh look at the operations involved in winning the war in Europe. The authors begin with an examination of prewar planning for various contingencies, then move to the origins of "Germany first" in American war planning. They then focus on the concept, favored by both George C. Marshall and Dwight D. Eisenhower, that the United States and its Allies had to conduct a cross-channel attack and undertake an offensive aimed at the heartland of Germany. Following this background contained in the initial chapters, the remainder of the book provides a comprehensive discussion outlining how the European Campaign was carried out. The authors conclude that American political leaders and war planners established logical and achievable objectives for the nation's military forces. However during the campaign's execution, American military leaders were slow to put into practice what would later be called operational level warfare. For comparison, the authors include an appendix covering German efforts at war planning in the tumultuous 1920s and 1930s
Sujet - Nom commun : Guerre mondiale (1939-1945) -- Campagnes et batailles -- Front occidental
  Guerre mondiale (1939-1945) -- États-Unis
  Planification militaire -- États-Unis
  Planification militaire -- Allemagne
  Planification militaire -- Études de cas
  Prise de décision -- Études de cas
  Art des opérations (science militaire) -- Études de cas
